Summary of Morrow v. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 69 by Rigdon, David H.
Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law
Nevada Supreme Court Summaries Law Journals
2-14-2013
Summary of Morrow v. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. Adv. Op.
69
David H. Rigdon
Nevada Law Journal
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs
Part of the Civil Procedure Commons
This Case Summary is brought to you by Scholarly Commons @ UNLV Law, an institutional repository administered by the Wiener-Rogers Law
Library at the William S. Boyd School of Law. For more information, please contact david.mcclure@unlv.edu.
Recommended Citation
Rigdon, David H., "Summary of Morrow v. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 69" (2013). Nevada Supreme Court Summaries. Paper 120.
http://scholars.law.unlv.edu/nvscs/120
Morrow v. Dist. Ct., 129 Nev. Adv. Op. 69 (February 14, 2013)
1
 
 
CIVIL PROCEDURE – PEREMPTORY CHALLENGE OF JUDGES 
 
Summary 
 
 An original petition for a writ of mandamus from a district court order rejecting 
petitioner’s peremptory challenge of a judge in a divorce action.   
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 The ten day timeframe in which to file a peremptory challenge of a judge under SCR 48.1 
commences with notice to the party of a hearing in the matter regardless of whether the party has 
made an appearance.  However, in accordance with NRCP 6(a), non-judicial days are not 
counted as days within the ten day timeframe.      
 
Facts and Procedural History 
 
 On April 18
th
, 2012, real party in interest Kourtney Morrow (hereinafter “Kourtney”) 
filed a complaint for divorce from Craig and a motion for child custody with the Eight Judicial 
District Court.  Since the motion raised issues of temporary child custody, a hearing was set for 
May 18, 2012, to be heard by the Honorable Robert Teuton.  On April 20, 2012, Kourtney 
properly served Craig Morrow (hereinafter “Craig”) with the summons, complaint, and motion.  
On May 3, 2012, Craig retained counsel and on May 4, 2012, through counsel, made his first 
appearance and filed a peremptory challenge against Judge Teuton.  On May 8, 2012, the clerk 
of the court reassigned the matter to the Honorable Cynthia Dianne Steel.  On May 11, 2012, 
Judge Steel issued an order rejecting the peremptory challenge and transferring the matter back 
to Judge Teuton.  In the order, Judge Steel determined that, according to SCR 48.1, the time to 
file a peremptory challenge had expired on April 30, 2012, ten calendar days after Craig was 
served notice.  Craig then filed a writ petition challenging the order.    
 
Discussion 
 
 The three-justice panel issued a per curiam opinion on the computation of allowable time 
for filing a peremptory challenge, which was an issue of first impression. 
 
Peremptory Challenge Rule 
 
 As a matter or right, each party in a district court civil action is entitled to peremptorily 
challenge the judge assigned to the case before any hearing is commenced or any ruling is made 
on a contested matter.
2
  Any such challenge must be made within ten days after notification to 
the parties of a trial or hearing date.
3
   
 
                                                 
1
  By David H. Rigdon. 
2
  SUP. CT. R. 48.1(1); SUP. CT. R. 48.1(5). 
3
  SUP. CT. R.  48.1(3). 
Craig argued that the time to file a peremptory challenge cannot expire until a party has 
made a first appearance. Kourtney argued that under the plain language of SCR 48.1 the time to 
file a peremptory challenge may expire before a first appearance and therefore the District Court 
properly rejected the challenge. While Craig argued that the summons giving him notice of the 
hearing stated that he had twenty days to respond to the complaint, the Court held NRCP 
12(a)(1), which provides a party twenty days to answer a complaint before a default judgment 
may be issued, does not hold in abeyance all other required timelines.
4
  Under the plain language 
of the rule, the Court held that since Craig was properly served with notice of the hearing on 
April 20, 2012, the ten day period of SCR 48.1(3)(a) commenced on that date. 
 
The NRCP control the computation of time for SCR 48.1(3) 
 
 SCR 4 provides that if an act that is required to be done by a party falls on a non-judicial 
day, the act must be performed on the next succeeding judicial day.
5
  By contrast, NCRP 6(a) 
expressly sets forth the method for computing time for any time limit prescribed by the NRCP, 
local rules of a district court, orders of the court, or by any applicable statute.
6
  Kourtney argued 
that SCR 4 operates to make NRCP 6(a) inapplicable.  To resolve the issue the Court applied the 
long standing rule of statutory interpretation that where two rules apply, they are to be 
harmonized and read so as to give effect to both wherever possible.
7
  The Court held that SCR 4 
and NCRP 6(a) are not in conflict since SCR 4 only deals with the situation where the final day 
an act must be done falls on a non-judicial day whereas NRCP 6(a) deals with the computation 
of time limits from beginning to end.   
 
Since the NRCP govern the procedure in any civil action in a district court
8
 and SCR 
48.1(1) specifically states that it is a procedure in a civil action in a district court
9
, the Court held 
that SCR 48.1 falls within the ambit of the NRCP.  NCRP 6(a) provides that, where a specified 
time limit is eleven days or less, non-judicial days shall not be counted.
10
  Therefore, the Court 
held that the District Court erred in failing to exclude non-judicial days from the ten day time 
limit imposed by SCR 48.1.  
 
Conclusion 
 
 The Court concluded that the peremptory challenge was properly filed and granted the 
petition for mandamus directing the district court to vacate its order and reassign the case to 
another judge.  The Court held that while the plain language of SCR 48.1 requires a peremptory 
challenge to be filed within ten days of receipt of a notice of hearing, NRCP 6(a)’s exclusion of 
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  See NEV. R. CIV. P. 12(a)(1) (“A defendant shall serve an answer within 20 days after being served with the 
summons and complaint, unless otherwise provided by statute when service of process is made pursuant to Rule 
4(e)(3)”). 
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   SUP. CT. R.  4. 
6
  NEV. R. CIV. P. 6(a). 
7
  Albios v. Horizon Cmty’s, Inc., 122 Nev. 409, 418, 132 P.3d 1022, 1028 (2006). 
8
  NEV. R. CIV. P. 1 (“These rules govern the procedure in the district courts in all suits of a civil nature whether 
cognizable as cases at law or in equity, with the exceptions stated in Rule 81. They shall be construed and 
administered to secure the just, speedy, and inexpensive determination of every action”). 
9
  SUP. CT. R.  48.1(1) (“In any civil action pending in a district court . . .”). 
10
  NEV. R. CIV. P. 6(a). 
non-judicial days from the computation of time for periods of eleven days or less applies.  After 
excluding the non-judicial days, Craig’s peremptory challenge was filed within the ten day 
timeframe.  
   
